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Abstract
Increasing use of computers and networks in business, government,
recreation, and almost all aspects of daily life has led to a proliferation of
online sensitive data about individuals and organizations. Consequently,
concern about the privacy of these data has become a top priority, par-
ticularly those data that are created and used in electronic commerce.
There have been many formulations of privacy and, unfortunately, many
negative results about the feasibility of maintaining privacy of sensitive
data in realistic networked environments. We formulate communication-
complexity-based definitions, both worst-case and average-case, of a prob-
lem’s privacy-approximation ratio. We use our definitions to investigate
the extent to which approximate privacy is achievable in two standard
problems: the 2nd-price Vickrey auction [22] and the millionaires prob-
lem of Yao [24].
For both the 2nd-price Vickrey auction and the millionaires problem,
we show that not only is perfect privacy impossible or infeasibly costly
to achieve, but even close approximations of perfect privacy suffer from
the same lower bounds. By contrast, we show that, if the values of the
parties are drawn uniformly at random from {0, . . . , 2k − 1}, then, for
both problems, simple and natural communication protocols have privacy-
approximation ratios that are linear in k (i.e., logarithmic in the size of
the space of possible inputs). We conjecture that this improved privacy-
approximation ratio is achievable for any probability distribution.
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1 Introduction
Increasing use of computers and networks in business, government, recreation,
and almost all aspects of daily life has led to a proliferation of online sensitive
data about individuals and organizations. Consequently, the study of privacy
has become a top priority in many disciplines. Computer scientists have con-
tributed many formulations of the notion of privacy-preserving computation that
have opened new avenues of investigation and shed new light on some well stud-
ied problems.
One good example of a new avenue of investigation opened by concern about
privacy can be found in auction design, which was our original motivation for
this work. Traditional auction theory is a central research area in Economics,
and one of its main questions is how to incent bidders to behave truthfully, i.e.,
to reveal private information that auctioneers need in order to compute optimal
outcomes. More recently, attention has turned to the complementary goal of
enabling bidders not to reveal private information that auctioneers do not need
in order to compute optimal outcomes. The importance of bidders’ privacy,
like that of algorithmic efficiency, has become clear now that many auctions
are conducted online, and Computer Science has become at least as relevant as
Economics.
Our approach to privacy is based on communication complexity. Although
originally motivated by agents’ privacy in mechanism design, our definitions and
tools can be applied to distributed function computation in general. Because
perfect privacy can be impossible or infeasibly costly to achieve, we investigate
approximate privacy. Specifically, we formulate both worst-case and average-
case versions of the privacy-approximation ratio of a function f in order to
quantify the amount of privacy that can be maintained by parties who supply
sensitive inputs to a distributed computation of f . We also study the tradeoff
between privacy preservation and communication complexity.
Our points of departure are the work of Chor and Kushilevitz [8] on char-
acterization of privately computable functions and that of Kushilevitz [17] on
the communication complexity of private computation. Starting from the same
place, Bar-Yehuda et al. [2] also provided a framework in which to quantify the
amount of privacy that can be maintained in the computation of a function and
the communication cost of achieving it. Their definitions and results are signif-
icantly different from the ones we present here (see discussion in Appendix A);
as explained in Section 6 below, a precise characterization of the relationship
between their formulation and ours is an interesting direction for future work.
1.1 Our Approach
Consider an auction of a Bluetooth headset with 2 bidders, 1 and 2, in which
the auctioneer accepts bids ranging from $0 to $7 in $1 increments. Each bidder
i has a private value xi ∈ {0, . . . , 7} that is the maximum he is willing to pay
for the headset. The item is sold in a 2nd-price Vickrey auction, i.e., the higher
bidder gets the item (with ties broken in favor of bidder 1), and the price he pays
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is the lower bid. The demand for privacy arises naturally in such scenarios [19]:
In a straightforward protocol, the auctioneer receives sealed bids from both
bidders and computes the outcome based on this information. Say, e.g., that
bidder 1 bids $3, and bidder 2 bids $6. The auctioneer sells the headset to bidder
2 for $3. It would not be at all surprising however if, in subsequent auctions of
headsets in which bidder 2 participates, the same auctioneer set a reservation
price of $5. This could be avoided if the auction protocol allowed the auctioneer
to learn the fact that bidder 2 was the highest bidder (something he needs to
know in order to determine the outcome) but did not entail the full revelation
of 2’s private value for the headset.
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Figure 1: The minimal knowledge requirements for 2nd-price auctions
Observe that, in some cases, revelation of the exact private information of
the highest bidder is necessary. For example, if x1 = 6, then bidder 2 will win
only if x2 = 7. In other cases, the revelation of a lot of information is necessary,
e.g., if bidder 1’s bid is 5, and bidder 2 outbids him, then x2 must be either
6 or 7. An auction protocol is said to achieve perfect objective privacy if the
auctioneer learns nothing about the private information of the bidders that is
not needed in order to compute the result of the auction. Figure 1 illustrates
the information the auctioneer must learn in order to determine the outcome
of the 2nd-price auction described above. Observe that the auctioneer’s failure
to distinguish between two potential pairs of inputs that belong to different
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rectangles in Fig. 1 implies his inability to determine the winner or the price
the winner must pay. Also observe, however, that the auctioneer need not be
able to distinguish between two pairs of inputs that belong to the same rectangle.
Using the “minimal knowledge requirements” described in Fig. 1, we can now
characterize a perfectly (objective) privacy-preserving auction protocol as one
that induces this exact partition of the space of possible inputs into subspaces in
which the inputs are indistinguishable to the auctioneer. Unfortunately, perfect
privacy is often hard or even impossible to achieve. For 2nd-price auctions,
Brandt and Sandholm [6] show that every perfectly private auction protocol
has exponential communication complexity. This provides the motivation for
our definition of privacy-approximation ratio: We are interested in whether
there is an auction protocol that achieves “good” privacy guarantees without
paying such a high price in computational efficiency. We no longer insist that the
auction protocol induce a partition of inputs exactly as in Fig. 1 but rather that
it “approximate” the optimal partition well. We define two kinds of privacy-
approximation ratio (PAR): worst-case PAR and average-case PAR.
The worst-case PAR of a protocol P for the 2nd-price auction is defined
as the maximum ratio between the size of a set S of indistinguishable inputs
in Fig. 1 and the size of a set of indistinguishable inputs induced by P that
is contained in S. If a protocol is perfectly privacy preserving, these sets are
always the same size, and so the worst-case PAR is 1. If, however, a protocol
fails to achieve perfect privacy, then at least one “ideal” set of indistinguishable
inputs strictly contains a set of indistinguishable inputs induced by the protocol.
In such cases, the worst-case PAR will be strictly higher than 1.
Consider, e.g., the sealed-bid auction protocol in which both bidders reveal
their private information to the auctioneer, who then computes the outcome.
Obviously, this naive protocol enables the auctioneer to distinguish between
every two pairs of private inputs, and so each set of indistinguishable inputs
induced by the protocol contains exactly one element. The worst-case PAR
of this protocol is therefore 81 = 8. (If bidder 2’s value is 0, then in Fig. 1
the auctioneer is unable to determine which value in {0, . . . , 7} is x1. In the
sealed bid auction protocol, however, the auctioneer learns the exact value of
x1.) The average-case PAR is a natural Bayesian variant of this definition: We
now assume that the auctioneer has knowledge of some market statistics, in
the form of a probability distribution over the possible private information of
the bidders. PAR in this case is defined as the average ratio and not as the
maximum ratio as before.
Thus, intuitively, PAR captures the effect of a protocol on the privacy
(in the sense of indistinguishability from other inputs) afforded to protocol
participants—it indicates the factor by which, in the worst case or on aver-
age, using the protocol to compute the function, instead of just being told the
output, reduces the number of inputs from which a given input cannot be dis-
tinguished. To formalize and generalize the above intuitive definitions of PAR,
we make use of machinery from communication-complexity theory. Specifically,
we use the concepts of monochromaticity and tilings to make formal the notions
of sets of indistinguishable inputs and of the approximability of privacy. We
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discuss other notions of approximate privacy in Section 6.
1.2 Our Findings
We present both upper and lower bounds on the privacy-approximation ratio
for both the millionaires problem and 2nd-price auctions with 2 bidders. Our
analysis of these two environments takes place within Yao’s 2-party commu-
nication model [23], in which the private information of each party is a k-bit
string, representing a value in {0, . . . , 2k − 1}. In the millionaires problem,
the two parties (the millionaires) wish to keep their private information hidden
from each other. We refer to this goal as the preservation of subjective privacy.
In electronic-commerce environments, each party (bidder) often communicates
with the auctioneer via a secure channel, and so the aim in the 2nd-price auction
is to prevent a third party (the auctioneer), who is unfamiliar with any of the
parties’ private inputs, from learning “too much” about the bidders. This goal
is referred to, in this paper, as the preservation of objective privacy.
Informally, for both the 2nd-price Vickrey auction and the millionaires prob-
lem, we obtain the following results: We show that not only is perfect privacy
impossible or infeasibly costly to achieve, but even close approximations of per-
fect privacy suffer from the same lower bounds. By contrast, we show that, if the
values of the parties are drawn uniformly at random from {0, . . . , 2k− 1}, then,
for both problems, simple and natural communication protocols have privacy-
approximation ratios that are linear in k (i.e., logarithmic in the size of the
space of possible inputs). We conjecture that this improved PAR is achievable
for any probability distribution. The correctness of this conjecture would imply
that, no matter what beliefs the protocol designer may have about the parties’
private values, a protocol that achieves reasonable privacy guarantees exists.
Importantly, our results for the 2nd-price Vickrey auction are obtained by
proving a more general result for a large family of protocols for single-item auc-
tions, termed “bounded-bisection auctions”, that contains both the celebrated
ascending-price English auction and the class of bisection auctions [14, 15].
We show that our results for the millionaires problem also extend to the
classic economic problem of provisioning a public good, by observing that, in
terms of privacy-approximation ratios, the two problems are, in fact, equivalent.
1.3 Related Work: Defining Privacy-Preserving Compu-
tation
1.3.1 Communication-Complexity-Based Privacy Formulations
As explained above, the privacy work of Bar-Yehuda et al. [2] and the work
presented in this paper have common ancestors in [8,17]. Similarly, the work of
Brandt and Sandholm [6] uses Kushilevitz’s formulation to prove an exponential
lower bound on the communication complexity of privacy-preserving 2nd-price
Vickrey auctions. We elaborate on the relation of our work to that of Bar-
Yehuda et al. [2] in Appendix A.
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Similarly to [2, 8, 17], our work focuses on the two-party deterministic com-
munication model. We view our results as first step in a more general research
agenda, outlined in Sec. 6.
There are many formulations of privacy-preserving computation, both exact
and approximate, that are not based on the definitions and tools in [8, 17]. We
now briefly review some of them and explain how they differ from ours.
1.3.2 Secure, Multiparty Function Evaluation
The most extensively developed approach to privacy in distributed computation
is that of secure, multiparty function evaluation (SMFE). Indeed, to achieve
agent privacy in algorithmic mechanism design, which was our original moti-
vation, one could, in principle, simply start with a strategyproof mechanism
and then have the agents themselves compute the outcome and payments using
an SMFE protocol. However, as observed by Brandt and Sandholm [6], these
protocols fall into two main categories, and both have inherent disadvantages
from the point of view of mechanism design:
• Information-theoretically private protocols, the study of which was initi-
ated by Ben-Or, Goldwasser, and Wigderson [4] and Chaum, Cre´peau,
and Damgaard [7], rely on the assumption that a constant fraction of
the agents are “honest” (or “obedient” in the terminology of distributed
algorithmic mechanism design [12]), i.e., that they follow the protocol per-
fectly even if they know that doing so will lead to an outcome that is not
as desirable to them as one that would result from their deviating from
the protocol; clearly, this assumption is antithetical to the main premise
of mechanism design, which is that all agents will behave strategically,
deviating from protocols when and only when doing so will improve the
outcome from their points of view;
• Multiparty protocols that use cryptography to achieve privacy, the study
of which was initiated by Yao [24, 25], rely on (plausible but currently
unprovable) complexity-theoretic assumptions. Often, they are also very
communication-intensive (see, e.g., [6] for an explanation of why some of
the deficiencies of the Vickrey auction cannot be solved via cryptogra-
phy). Moreover, sometimes the deployment cryptographic machinery is
infeasible (over the years, many cryptographic variants of the current in-
terdomain routing protocol, BGP, were proposed, but not deployed due to
the infeasibility of deploying a global Internet-wide PKI infrastructure and
the real-time computational cost of verifying signatures). For some mech-
anisms of interest, efficient cryptographic protocols have been obtained
(see, e.g., [9, 19]).
In certain scenarios, the demand for perfect privacy preservation cannot
be relaxed. In such cases, if the function cannot be computed in a privacy-
preserving manner without the use of cryptography, there is no choice but to
resort to a cryptographic protocol. There is an extensive body of work on
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cryptography-based identity protocols, and we are not offering our notion of
PAR as an extension of that work. (In fact, the framework described here
might be applied to SMFE protocols by replacing indistinguishability by com-
putational indistinguishability. However, this does not appear to yield any new
insights.)
However, in other cases, we argue that privacy preservation should be re-
garded as one of several design goals, alongside low computational/communication
complexity, protocol simplicity, incentive-compatibility, and more. Therefore, it
is necessary to be able to quantify privacy preservation in order to understand
the tradeoffs among the different design goals, and obtain “reasonable” (but
not necessarily perfect) privacy guarantees. Our PAR approach continues the
long line of research about information-theoretic notions of privacy, initiated by
Ben-Or et al. and by Chaum et al. Regardless of the above argument, we believe
that information-theoretic formulations of privacy and approximate privacy are
also natural to consider in their own right.
1.3.3 Private Approximations and Approximate Privacy
In this paper, we consider protocols that compute exact results but preserve
privacy only approximately. One can also ask what it means for a protocol
to compute approximate results in a privacy-preserving manner; indeed, this
question has also been studied [3,11,16], but it is unrelated to the questions we
ask here. Similarly, definitions and techniques from differential privacy [10] (see
also [13]), in which the goal is to add noise to the result of a database query
in such a way as to preserve the privacy of the individual database records
(and hence protect the data subjects) but still have the result convey nontrivial
information, are inapplicable to the problems that we study here.
1.4 Paper Outline
In the next section, we review and expand upon the connection between perfect
privacy and communication complexity. We present our formulations of approx-
imate privacy, both worst case and average case, in Section 3; we present our
main results in Sections 4 and 5. Discussion and future directions can be found
in Section 6.
2 Perfect Privacy and Communication Complex-
ity
We now briefly review Yao’s model of two-party communication and notions
of objective and subjective perfect privacy; see Kushilevitz and Nisan [18] for
a comprehensive overview of communication complexity theory. Note that we
only deal with deterministic communication protocols. Our definitions can be
extended to randomized protocols.
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2.1 Two-Party Communication Model
There are two parties, 1 and 2, each holding a k-bit input string. The in-
put of party i, xi ∈ {0, 1}
k, is the private information of i. The parties
communicate with each other in order to compute the value of a function
f : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}k → {0, 1}t. The two parties alternately send messages
to each other. In communication round j, one of the parties sends a bit qj
that is a function of that party’s input and the history (q1, . . . , qj−1) of pre-
viously sent messages. We say that a bit is meaningful if it is not a constant
function of this input and history and if, for every meaningful bit transmitted
previously, there some combination of input and history for which the bit differs
from the earlier meaningful bit. Non-meaningful bits (e.g., those sent as part of
protocol-message headers) are irrelevant to our work here and will be ignored. A
communication protocol dictates, for each party, when it is that party’s turn to
transmit a message and what message he should transmit, based on the history
of messages and his value.
A communication protocol P is said to compute f if, for every pair of inputs
(x1, x2), it holds that P (x1, x2) = f(x1, x2). As in [17], the last message sent in
a protocol P is assumed to contain the value f(x1, x2) and therefore may require
up to t bits. The communication complexity of a protocol P is the maximum,
over all input pairs, of the number of bits transmitted during the execution of
P .
Any function f : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}k → {0, 1}t can be visualized as a 2k × 2k
matrix with entries in {0, 1}t, in which the rows represent the possible inputs
of party 1, the columns represent the possible inputs of party 2, and each entry
contains the value of f associated with its row and column inputs. This matrix
is denoted by A(f).
Definition 1 (Regions, partitions) A region in a matrix A is any subset of
entries in A (not necessarily a submatrix of A). A partition of A is a collection
of disjoint regions in A whose union equals A.
Definition 2 (Monochromaticity) A region R in a matrix A is called mono-
chromatic if all entries in R contain the same value. A monochromatic partition
of A is a partition all of whose regions are monochromatic.
Of special interest in communication complexity are specific kinds of regions
and partitions called rectangles, and tilings, respectively:
Definition 3 (Rectangles, Tilings) A rectangle in a matrix A is a submatrix
of A. A tiling of a matrix A is a partition of A into rectangles.
Definition 4 (Refinements) A tiling T1(f) of a matrix A(f) is said to be a
refinement of another tiling T2(f) of A(f) if every rectangle in T1(f) is contained
in some rectangle in T2(f).
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Monochromatic rectangles and tilings are an important concept in commu-
nication-complexity theory, because they are linked to the execution of commu-
nication protocols. Every communication protocol P for a function f can be
thought of as follows:
1. Let R and C be the sets of row and column indices of A(f), respectively.
For R′ ⊆ R and C′ ⊆ C, we will abuse notation and write R′ × C′ to
denote the submatrix of A(f) obtained by deleting the rows not in R′ and
the columns not in C′.
2. While R × C is not monochromatic:
• One party i ∈ {0, 1} sends a single bit q (whose value is based on xi
and the history of communication).
• If i = 1, q indicates whether 1’s value is in one of two disjoint sets
R1, R2 whose union equals R. If x1 ∈ R1, both parties set R = R1.
If x1 ∈ R2, both parties set R = R2.
• If i = 2, q indicates whether 2’s value is in one of two disjoint sets
C1, C2 whose union equals C. If x2 ∈ C1, both parties set C = C1.
If x2 ∈ C2, both parties set C = C2.
3. One of the parties sends a last message (consisting of up to t bits) con-
taining the value in all entries of the monochromatic rectangle R× C.
Observe that, for every pair of private inputs (x1, x2), P terminates at some
monochromatic rectangle in A(f) that contains (x1, x2). We refer to this rect-
angle as “the monochromatic rectangle induced by P for (x1, x2)”. We refer to
the tiling that consists of all rectangles induced by P (for all pairs of inputs) as
“the monochromatic tiling induced by P”.
Figure 2: A tiling that cannot be induced by any communication protocol [17]
Remark 2.1 There are monochromatic tilings that cannot be induced by com-
munication protocols. For example, observe that the tiling in Fig. 2 (which is
essentially an example from [17]) has this property.
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2.2 Perfect Privacy
Informally, we say that a two-party protocol is perfectly privacy-preserving if
the two parties (or a third party observing the communication between them)
cannot learn more from the execution of the protocol than the value of the
function the protocol computes. (These definition can be extended naturally to
protocols involving more than two participants.)
Formally, let P be a communication protocol for a function f . The commu-
nication string passed in P is the concatenation of all the messages (q1, q2 . . .)
sent in the course of the execution of P . Let s(x1,x2) denote the communication
string passed in P if the inputs of the parties are (x1, x2). We are now ready
to define perfect privacy. The following two definitions handle privacy from the
point of view of a party i that does not want the other party (who is, of course,
familiar not only with the communication string, but also with his own value) to
learn more than necessary about i’s private information. We say that a protocol
is perfectly private with respect to party 1 if 1 never learns more about party
2’s private information than necessary to compute the outcome.
Definition 5 (Perfect privacy with respect to 1) [8, 17] P is perfectly
private with respect to party 1 if, for every x2, x
′
2 such that f(x1, x2) = f(x1, x
′
2),
it holds that s(x1,x2) = s(x1,x′2).
Informally, Def. 5 says that party 1’s knowledge of the communication string
passed in the protocol and his knowledge of x1 do not aid him in distinguishing
between two possible inputs of 2. Similarly:
Definition 6 (Perfect privacy with respect to 2) [8, 17] P is perfectly
private with respect to party 2 if, for every x1, x
′
1 such that f(x1, x2) = f(x
′
1, x2),
it holds that s(x1,x2) = s(x′1,x2).
Observation 2.2 For any function f , the protocol in which party i reveals xi
and the other party computes the outcome of the function is perfectly private
with respect to i.
Definition 7 (Perfect subjective privacy) P achieves perfect subjective pri-
vacy if it is perfectly private with respect to both parties.
The following definition considers a different form of privacy—privacy from
a third party that observes the communication string but has no a priori knowl-
edge about the private information of the two communicating parties. We refer
to this notion as “objective privacy”.
Definition 8 (Perfect objective privacy) P achieves perfect objective pri-
vacy if, for every two pairs of inputs (x1, x2) and (x
′
1, x
′
2) such that f(x1, x2) =
f(x′1, x
′
2), it holds that s(x1,x2) = s(x′1,x′2).
Kushilevitz [17] was the first to point out the interesting connections between
perfect privacy and communication-complexity theory. Intuitively, we can think
10
of any monochromatic rectangle R in the tiling induced by a protocol P as a
set of inputs that are indistinguishable to a third party. This is because, by
definition of R, for any two pairs of inputs in R, the communication string
passed in P must be the same. Hence we can think of the privacy of the
protocol in terms of the tiling induced by that protocol.
Ideally, every two pairs of inputs that are assigned the same outcome by
a function f will belong to the same monochromatic rectangle in the tiling
induced by a protocol for f . This observation enables a simple characterization
of perfect privacy-preserving mechanisms.
Definition 9 (Ideal monochromatic partitions) A monochromatic region
in a matrix A is said to be a maximal monochromatic region if no monochro-
matic region in A properly contains it. The ideal monochromatic partition of A
is made up of the maximal monochromatic regions.
Observation 2.3 For every possible value in a matrix A, the maximal mono-
chromatic region that corresponds to this value is unique. This implies the
uniqueness of the ideal monochromatic partition for A.
Observation 2.4 (A characterization of perfectly privacy-preserving
protocols) A communication protocol P for f is perfectly privacy-preserving
iff the monochromatic tiling induced by P is the ideal monochromatic partition
of A(f). This holds for all of the above notions of privacy.
3 Privacy-Approximation Ratios
Unfortunately, perfect privacy should not be taken for granted. As shown by
our results, in many environments, perfect privacy can be either impossible or
very costly (in terms of communication complexity) to obtain. To measure a
protocol’s effect on privacy, relative to the ideal—but perhaps impossible to
implement—computation of the outcome of a problem, we introduce the notion
of privacy-approximation ratios (PARs).
3.1 Worst-Case PARs
For any communication protocol P for a function f , we denote by RP (x1, x2) the
monochromatic rectangle induced by P for (x1, x2). We denote by R
I(x1, x2)
the monochromatic region containing A(f)(x1,x2) in the ideal monochromatic
partition of A(f). Intuitively, RP (x1, x2) is the set of inputs that are indis-
tinguishable from (x1, x2) to P . R
I(x1, x2) is the set of inputs that would be
indistinguishable from (x1, x2) if perfect privacy were preserved. We wish to
asses how far one is from the other. The size of a region R, denoted by |R|, is
the cardinality of R, i.e., the number of inputs in R.
We can now define worst-case objective PAR as follows:
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Definition 10 (Worst-case objective PAR of P ) The worst-case objective
privacy-approximation ratio of communication protocol P for function f is
α = max
(x1,x2)
|RI(x1, x2)|
|RP (x1, x2)|
.
We say that P is α-objective-privacy-preserving in the worst case.
Definition 11 (i-partitions) The 1-partition of a region R in a matrix A is
the set of disjoint rectangles Rx1 = {x1} × {x2 s.t. (x1, x2) ∈ R} (over all
possible inputs x1). 2-partitions are defined analogously.
Intuitively, given any region R in the matrix A(f), if party i’s actual private
information is xi, then i can use this knowledge to eliminate all the parts of R
other than Rxi . Hence, the other party should be concerned not with R but
rather with the i-partition of R.
Definition 12 (i-induced tilings) The i-induced tiling of a protocol P is the
refinement of the tiling induced by P obtained by i-partitioning each rectangle
in it.
Definition 13 (i-ideal monochromatic partitions) The i-ideal monochro-
matic partition is the refinement of the ideal monochromatic partition obtained
by i-partitioning each region in it.
For any communication protocol P for a function f , we use RPi (x1, x2) to
denote the monochromatic rectangle containing A(f)(x1,x2) in the i-induced
tiling for P . We denote by RIi (x1, x2) the monochromatic rectangle contain-
ing A(f)(x1,x2) in the i-ideal monochromatic partition of A(f).
Definition 14 (Worst-case PAR of P with respect to i) The worst-case
privacy-approximation ratio with respect to i of communication protocol P for
function f is
α = max
(x1,x2)
|RIi (x1, x2)|
|RPi (x1, x2)|
.
We say that P is α-privacy-preserving with respect to i in the worst case.
Definition 15 (Worst-case subjective PAR of P ) The worst-case subjec-
tive privacy-approximation ratio of communication protocol P for function f is
the maximum of the worst-case privacy-approximation ratio with respect to each
party.
Definition 16 (Worst-case PAR) The worst-case objective (subjective) PAR
for a function f is the minimum, over all protocols P for f , of the worst-case
objective (subjective) PAR of P .
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3.2 Average-Case PARs
As we shall see below, it is also useful to define an average-case version of
PAR. As the name suggests, the average-case objective PAR is the average
ratio between the size of the monochromatic rectangle containing the private
inputs and the corresponding region in the ideal monochromatic partition.
Definition 17 (Average-case objective PAR of P ) Let D be a probabil-
ity distribution over the space of inputs. The average-case objective privacy-
approximation ratio of communication protocol P for function f is
α = ED [
|RI(x1, x2)|
|RP (x1, x2)|
].
We say that P is α-objective privacy-preserving in the average case with
distribution D (or with respect to D).
We define average-case PAR with respect to i analogously, and average-case
subjective PAR as the maximum over all players i of the average-case PAR
with respect to i. We define the average-case objective (subjective) PAR for
a function f as the minimum, over all protocols P for f , of the average-case
objective (subjective) PAR of P .
4 The Millionaires Problem and Public Goods:
Bounds on PARs
In this section, we prove upper and lower bounds on the privacy-approximation
ratios for two classic problems: Yao’s millionaires problem and the provision of
a public good.
4.1 Problem Specifications
The millionaires problem. Two millionaires want to know which one is
richer. Each millionaire’s wealth is private information known only to him, and
the millionaire wishes to keep it that way. The goal is to discover the identity of
the richer millionaire while preserving the (subjective) privacy of both parties.
Definition 18 (The Millionaires Problemk)
Input: x1, x2 ∈ {0, . . . , 2
k − 1} (each represented by a k-bit string)
Output: the identity of the party with the higher value, i.e., argmaxi∈{0,1} xi
(breaking ties lexicographically).
There cannot be a perfectly privacy-preserving communication protocol for
The Millionaires Problemk [17]. Hence, we are interested in the PARs for
this well studied problem.
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The public-good problem. There are two agents, each with a private value
in {0, . . . , 2k − 1} that represents his benefit from the construction of a public
project (public good), e.g., a bridge.1 The goal of the social planner is to build
the public project only if the sum of the agents’ values is at least its cost, where,
as in [1], the cost is set to be 2k − 1.
Definition 19 (Public Goodk)
Input: x1, x2 ∈ {0, . . . , 2
k − 1} (each represented by a k-bit string)
Output: “Build” if x1 + x2 ≥ 2
k − 1, “Do Not Build” otherwise.
It is easy to show (via Observation 2.4) that for Public Goodk, as for
The Millionaires Problemk, no perfectly privacy-preserving communication
protocol exists. Therefore, we are interested in the PARs for this problem.
4.2 The Millionaires Problem
The following theorem shows that not only is perfect subjective privacy unattain-
able for The Millionaires Problemk, but a stronger result holds:
Theorem 4.1 (A worst-case lower bound on subjective PAR) No com-
munication protocol for The Millionaires Problemk has a worst-case sub-
jective PAR less than 2
k
2 .
Proof: Consider a communication protocol P for The Millionaires Prob-
lemk. Let R represent the space of possible inputs of millionaire 1, and let
C represent the space of possible inputs of millionaire 2. In the beginning,
R = C = {0, . . . , 2k − 1}. Consider the first (meaningful) bit q transmitted in
course of P ’s execution. Let us assume that this bit is transmitted by millionaire
1. This bit indicates whether 1’s value belongs to one of two disjoint subsets of
R, R1 and R2, whose union equals R. Because we are interested in the worst
case, we can choose adversarially to which of these subsets 1’s input belongs.
Without loss of generality, let 0 ∈ R1. We decide adversarially that 1’s value is
in R1 and set R = R1. Similarly, if q is transmitted by millionaire 2, then we
set C to be the subset of C containing 0 in the partition of 2’s inputs induced
by q. We continue this process recursively for each bit transmitted in P .
Observe that, as long as both R and C contain at least two values, P is inca-
pable of computing The Millionaires Problemk. This is because 0 belongs
to both R and C, and so P cannot eliminate, for either of the millionaires, the
possibility that that millionaire has a value of 0 and the other millionaire has a
positive value. Hence, this process will go on until P determines that the value
of one of the millionaires is exactly 0, i.e., until either R = {0} or C = {0}. Let
us examine these two cases:
• Case I: R = {0}. Consider the subcase in which x2 equals 0. Recall that
0 ∈ C, and so this is possible. Observe that, in this case, P determines
1This is a discretization of the classic public good problem, in which the private values are
taken from an interval of reals, as in [1, 5].
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the exact value of x1, despite the fact that, in the 2-ideal-monochromatic
partition, all 2k possible values of x1 are in the same monochromatic
rectangle when x2 = 0 (because for all these values 1 wins). Hence, we
get a lower bound of 2k on the subjective privacy-approximation ratio.
• Case II: C = {0}. Let m denote the highest input in R. We consider
two subcases. If m ≤ 2
k
2 , then observe that the worst-case subjective
privacy-approximation ratio is at least 2
k
2 . In the 2-ideal-monochromatic
partition, all 2k possible values of x1 are in the same monochromatic
rectangle if x2 = 0, and the fact that m ≤ 2
k
2 implies that |R| ≤ 2
k
2 .
If, on the other hand, m > 2
k
2 , then consider the case in which x1 = m
and x2 = 0. Observe that, in the 1-ideal-monochromatic partition, all
values of millionaire 2 in {0, . . . ,m − 1} are in the same monochromatic
rectangle if x1 = m. However, P will enable millionaire 1 to determine
that millionaire 2’s value is exactly 0. This implies a lower bound of m on
the subjective privacy-approximation. We now use the fact that m > 2
k
2
to conclude the proof.
By contrast, we show that fairly good privacy guarantees can be obtained in
the average case. We define the Bisection Protocol for The Millionaires
Problemk as follows: Ask each millionaire whether his value lies in [0, 2
k−1) or
in [2k−1, 2k); continue this binary search until the millionaires’ answers differ,
at which point we know which millionaire has the higher value. If the answers
never differ the tie is broken in favor of millionaire 1.
We may exactly compute the average-case subjective PAR with respect to
the uniform distribution for the Bisection Protocol applied to The Mil-
lionaires Problemk. Figure 3 illustrates the approach. The far left of the
figure shows the ideal partition (for k = 3) of the value space for The Million-
aires Problemk; these regions are indicated with heavy lines in all parts of the
figure. The center-left shows the 1-partition of the regions in the ideal partition;
the center-right shows the 1-induced tiling that is induced by the Bisection
Protocol. The far right illustrates how we may rearrange the tiles that parti-
tion the bottom-left region in the ideal partition (by reflecting them across the
dashed line) to obtain a tiling of the value space that is the same as the tiling
induced by applying the Bisection Auction to 2nd-Price Auctionk.
Theorem 4.2 The average-case subjective PAR of the bisection proto-
col The average-case subjective PAR with respect to the uniform distribution
for the Bisection Protocol applied to The Millionaires Problemk is
k
2 + 1.
Proof: Given a value of i, consider the i-induced-tiling obtained by running
the Bisection Protocol forThe Millionaires Problemk (as in the center-
right of Fig. 3 for i = 1). Rearrange the rectangles in which player i wins by
reflecting them across the line running from the bottom-left corner to the top-
right corner (the dashed line in the far right of Fig. 3). This produces a tiling
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Figure 3: Left to right: The ideal partition (for k = 3) for The Millionaires
Problemk; the 1-partition of the ideal regions; the 1-induced tiling induced by
the Bisection Protocol; the rearrangement used in the proof of Thm. 4.2
of the value space in which the region in which player 1 wins is tiled by tiles of
width 1, and the region in which player 2 wins is tiled by tiles of height 1; in
computing the average-case-approximate-privacy with respect to i, the tile-size
ratios that we use are the heights (widths) of the tiles to the height (width) of
the tile containing all values in that column (row) for which player 1 (2) wins.
This tiling and the tile-size ratios in question are exactly as in the computation
of the average-case objective privacy for 2nd-Price Auctionk; the argument
used in Thm. 5.8 (for g(k) = k) below completes the proof.
Consider the case in which a third party is observing the interaction of the
two millionaires. How much can this observer learn about the private informa-
tion of the two millionaires? We show that, unlike the case of subjective privacy,
good PARs are unattainable even in the average case.
Because the values (i, i) (in which case player 1 wins) and the values (i, i+1)
(in which player 2 wins) must all appear in different tiles in any tiling that refines
the ideal partition of the value space for The Millionaires Problemk, any
such tiling must include at least 2k tiles in which player 1 wins and 2k − 1 tiles
in which player 2 wins. The total contribution of a tile in which player 1 wins is
the number of values in that tile times the ratio of the ideal region containing
the tile to the size of the tile, divided by the total number (22k) of values in
the space. Each tile in which player 1 wins thus contributes (1+2
k)2k
22k+1
to the
average-case PAR under the uniform distribution; similarly, each tile in which
player 2 wins contributes 2
k(2k−1)
22k+1
to this quantity. This leads directly to the
following result.
Proposition 4.3 (A lower bound on average-case objective PAR) The
average-case objective PAR for The Millionaires Problemk with respect to
the uniform distribution is at least 2k − 12 + 2
−(k+1).
There are numerous different tilings of the value space that achieve this ratio
and that can be realized by communication protocols. For the Bisection Pro-
tocol, we obtain the same exponential (in k) growth rate but with a larger
constant factor.
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Proposition 4.4 (The average-case objective PAR of the bisection pro-
tocol) The Bisection Protocol for The Millionaires Problemk obtains
an average-case objective PAR of 3 · 2k−1 − 12 with respect to the uniform dis-
tribution.
Proof: The bisection mechanism induces a tiling that refines the ideal par-
tition and that has 2k+1 − 1 tiles in which the player 1 wins and 2k − 1 tiles
in which the player 2 wins. The contributions of each of these tiles is as noted
above, from which the result follows.
Finally, Table 1 summarizes our average-case PAR results (with respect to
the uniform distribution) for The Millionaires Problemk.
Average-Case Obj. PAR Average-Case Subj. PAR
Any Protocol ≥ 2k − 12 + 2
−(k+1)
Bisection Protocol 322
k − 12
k
2 + 1
Table 1: Average-case PARs for The Millionaires Problemk
4.3 The Public-Good Problem
The government is considering the construction of a bridge (a public good) at
cost c. Each taxpayer has a k-bit private value that is the utility he would gain
from the bridge if it were built. The government wants to build the bridge if
and only if the sum of the taxpayers’ private values is at least c. In the case that
c = 2k−1, we observe that xˆ2 = c−x2 is again a k-bit value and that x1+x2 ≥ c
if and only if x1 ≥ xˆ2; from the perspective of PAR, this problem is equivalent to
solving The Millionaires Problemk on inputs x1 and xˆ2. We may apply our
results for The Millionaires Problemk to see that the public-good problem
with c = 2k− 1 has exponential average-case objective PAR with respect to the
uniform distribution. Appendix B discusses average-case objective PAR for a
truthful version of the public-good problem.
5 2nd-Price Auctions: Bounds on PARs
In this section, we present upper and lower bounds on the privacy-approximation
ratios for the 2nd-price Vickrey auction.
5.1 Problem Specification
2nd-price Vickrey auction. A single item is offered to 2 bidders, each with
a private value for the item. The auctioneer’s goal is to allocate the item to
the bidder with the highest value. The fundamental technique in mechanism
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design for inducing truthful behavior in single-item auctions is Vickrey’s 2nd-
price auction [22]: Allocate the item to the highest bidder, and charge him the
second-highest bid.
Definition 20 (2nd-Price Auctionk)
Input: x1, x2 ∈ {0, . . . , 2
k − 1} (each represented by a k-bit string)
Output: the identity of the party with the higher value, i.e., argmaxi∈{0,1} xi
(breaking ties lexicographically), and the private information of the of the other
party.
Brandt and Sandholm [6] show that a perfectly privacy-preserving commu-
nication protocol exists for 2nd-Price Auctionk. Specifically, perfect privacy
is obtained via the ascending-price English auction: Start with a price of p = 0
for the item. In each time step, increase p by 1 until one of the bidders indicates
that his value for the item is less than p (in each step first asking bidder 1 and
then, if necessary, asking bidder 2). At that point, allocate the item to the other
bidder for a price of p− 1. If p reaches a value of 2k − 1 (that is, the values of
both bidders are 2k − 1) allocate the item to bidder 1 for a price of 2k − 1.
Moreover, it is shown in [6] that the English auction is essentially the only
perfectly privacy-preserving protocol for 2nd-Price Auctionk. Thus, perfect
privacy requires, in the worst-case, the transmission of Ω(2k) bits. 2k bits suffice,
because bidders can simply reveal their inputs. Can we obtain “good” privacy
without paying such a high price in communication?
5.2 Objective Privacy PARs
We now consider objective privacy for 2nd-Price Auctionk (i.e., privacy with
respect to the auctioneer). Bisection auctions [14, 15] for 2nd-Price Auc-
tionk are defined similarly to the Bisection Protocol for The Million-
aires Problemk: Use binary search to find a value c that lies between the two
bidders’ values, and let the bidder with the higher value be bidder j. (If the
values do not differ, we will also discover this; in this case, award the item to
bidder 1, who must pay the common value.) Use binary search on the interval
that contains the value of the lower bidder in order to find the value of the lower
bidder. Bisection auctions are incentive-compatible in ex-post Nash [14, 15].
More generally, we refer to an auction protocol as a c-bisection auction,
for a constant c ∈ (0, 1), if in each step the interval R is partitioned into two
disjoint subintervals: a lower subinterval of size c|R| and an upper subinterval
of size (1− c)|R|. Hence, the Bisection Auction is a c-bisection auction with
c = 12 . We prove that no c-bisection auction for The Millionaires Problemk
obtains a subexponential objective PAR:
Theorem 5.1 (A worst-case lower bound for c-bisection auctions) For
any constant c > 1
2k
, the c-bisection auction for 2nd-Price Auctionk has a
worst-case PAR of at least 2
k
2 .
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Proof: Consider the ideal monochromatic partition of 2nd-Price Auctionk
depicted for k = 3 in Fig. 1. Observe that, for perfect privacy to be preserved,
it must be that bidder 2 transmits the first (meaningful) bit, and that this
bit partitions the space of inputs into the leftmost shaded rectangle (the set
{0, . . . , 2k − 1} × {0}) and the rest of the value space (ignoring the rectangles
depicted that further refine {0, . . . , 2k − 1} × {1, . . . , 2k − 1}). What if the first
bit is transmitted by player 2 and does not partition the space into rectangles in
that way? We observe that any other partition of the space into two rectangles
is such that, in the worst case, the privacy-approximation ratio is at least 2
k
2
(for any value of c): If c ≤ 1− 2−
k
2 , then the case in which x1 = c2
k− 1 gives us
the lower bound. If, on the other hand, c > 1− 2−
k
2 , then the case that x1 = 0
gives us the lower bound. Observe that such a bad PAR is also the result of
bidder 1’s transmitting the first (meaningful) bit.
By contrast, as for The Millionaires Problemk, reasonable privacy guar-
antees are achievable in the average case:
Theorem 5.2 (The average-case objective PAR of the bisection auc-
tion) The average-case objective PAR of the Bisection Auction is k2 + 1
with respect to the uniform distribution.
Proof: This follows by taking g(k) = k in Thm. 5.8.
We note that the worst-possible approximation of objective privacy comes
when the each value in the space is in a distinct tile; this is the tiling induced by
the sealed-bid auction. The resulting average-case privacy-approximation ratio
is exponential in k.
Proposition 5.3 (Largest possible objective PAR) The largest possible (for
any protocol) average-case objective PAR with respect to the uniform distribution
for 2nd-Price Auctionk is
1
22k

2k−1∑
j=0
j2 +
2k−1∑
j=1
j2

 = 2
3
2k +
1
3
2−k
5.3 Subjective Privacy PARs
We now look briefly at subjective privacy for 2nd-Price Auctionk. For sub-
jective privacy with respect to 1, we start with the 1-partition for 2nd-Price
Auctionk; Fig. 4 shows the refinement of the 1-partition induced by the Bi-
section Auction for k = 4. Separately considering the refinement of the
2-partition for 2nd-Price Auctionk by the Bisection Auction, we have the
following results.
Theorem 5.4 (The average-case PAR with respect to 1 of the bisec-
tion auction) The average-case PAR with respect to 1 of the Bisection
Auction is
k + 3
4
−
k − 1
2k+2
19
Figure 4: The Bisection-Auction-induced refinement of the 1-partition for
2nd-Price Auctionk (k = 4)
with respect to the uniform distribution.
Proof: This follows by taking g(k) = k in Thm. 5.11.
Theorem 5.5 (The average-case PAR with respect to 2 of the bisec-
tion auction) The average-case PAR with respect to 2 of the Bisection
Auction is
k + 5
4
+
k − 1
2k+2
with respect to the uniform distribution.
Proof: This follows by taking g(k) = k in Thm. 5.12.
Corollary 5.6 (The average-case subjective PAR of the bisection auc-
tion) The average-case subjective PAR of the Bisection Auction with re-
spect to the uniform distribution is
k + 5
4
+
k − 1
2k+2
.
As for objective privacy, the sealed-bid auction gives the largest possible
average-case subjective PAR.
Proposition 5.7 (Largest possible subjective PAR) The largest possible
(for any protocol) average-case subjective PAR with respect to the uniform dis-
tribution for 2nd-Price Auctionk is
2k
3
+ 1−
1
3 · 2k
.
Proof: For the sealed-bid auction, the average-case PAR with respect to 1 is
1
22k

 2k∑
j=1
j +
2k−1∑
j=1
j2

 = 2k
3
+
1
3 · 2k−1
.
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For the sealed-bid auction, the average-case PAR with respect to 2 is
1
22k

 2k∑
j=1
j2 +
2k−1∑
j=1
j

 = 2k
3
+ 1−
1
3 · 2k
.
5.4 Bounded-Bisection Auctions
We now present a middle ground between the perfectly-private yet highly in-
efficient (in terms of communication) ascending English auction and the com-
munication-efficient Bisection Auction whose average-case objective PAR is
linear in k (and is thus unbounded as k goes to infinity): We bound the number
of bisections, using an ascending English auction to determine the outcome if it
is not resolved by the limited number of bisections.
We define the Bisection Auctiong(k) as follows: Given an instance of 2nd-
Price Auctionk, and a integer-valued function g(k) such that 0 ≤ g(k) ≤ k,
run the Bisection Auction as above but do at most g(k) bisection opera-
tions. (Note that we will never do more than k bisections.) If the outcome is
undetermined after g(k) bisection operations, so that both players’ values lie in
an interval I of size 2k−g(k), apply the ascending-price English auction to this
interval to determine the identity of the winning bidder and the value of the
losing bidder.
As g(k) ranges from 0 to k, the Bisection Auctiong(k) ranges from the
ascending-price English auction to the Bisection Auction. If we allow a
fixed, positive number of bisections (g(k) = c > 0), computations show that
for c = 1, 2, 3 we obtain examples of protocols that do not provide perfect
privacy but that do have bounded average-case objective PARs with respect
to the uniform distribution. We wish to see if this holds for all positive c,
determine the average-case objective PAR for general g(k), and connect the
amount of communication needed with the approximation of privacy in this
family of protocols. The following theorem allows us to do these things.
Theorem 5.8 For the Bisection Auctiong(k), the average-case objective PAR
with respect to the uniform distribution equals
g(k) + 3
2
−
2g(k)
2k+1
+
1
2k+1
−
1
2g(k)+1
.
Proof: Fix k, the number of bits used for bidding, and let c = g(k) be the
number of bisections; we have 0 ≤ c ≤ k, and we let i = k − c. Figure 5
illustrates this tiling for k = 4, c = 2, and i = 2; note that the upper-left
and lower-right quadrants have identical structure and that the lower-left and
upper-right quadrants have no structure other than that of the ideal partition
and the quadrant boundaries (which are induced by the first bisection operation
performed).
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Figure 5: Illustration for the proof of Thm. 5.8
Our general approach is the following. The average-case objective PAR with
respect to the uniform distribution equals
PAR =
1
22k
∑
(x1,x2)
|RI(x1, x2)|
|RP (x1, x2)|
,
where the sum is over all pairs (x1, x2) in the value space; recall that R
I(x1, x2)
is the region in the ideal partition that contains (x1, x2), and R
P (x1, x2) is the
rectangle in the tiling induced by the protocol that contains (x1, x2). We may
combine all of the terms corresponding to points in the same protocol-induced
rectangle to obtain
PAR =
1
22k
∑
R
|R|
|RI(R)|
|R|
=
1
22k
∑
R
|RI(R)|, (1)
where the sums are now over protocol-induced rectangles R (we will simplify
notation and write R instead of RP ), and RI(R) denotes the ideal region that
contains the protocol-induced rectangle R. Each ideal region in which bidder 1
wins is a rectangle of width 1 and height at most 2k; each ideal region in which
bidder 2 wins is a rectangle of height 1 and width strictly less than 2k. For
a protocol-induced rectangle R, let jR = 2
k − |RI(R)|. Let ac,i be the total
number of tiles that appear in the tiling of the k-bit value space induced by
the Bisection Auctiong(k) with g(k) = c, and let bc,i =
∑
R jR (with this
sum being over the protocol-induced tiles in this same partition). Then we may
rewrite (1) as
PARc,i =
1
22k
∑
R
(2k − jR) =
ac,i2
k − bc,i
22k
. (2)
(Note that (1) holds for general protocols; we now add the subscripts “c, i” to
indicate the particular PAR we are computing.) We now determine ac,i and
bc,i.
Considering the tiling induced by c + 1 bisections of a c + i + 1-bit space
(which has ac+1,i total tiles), the upper-left and lower-right quadrants each
22
contain ac,i tiles while the lower-left and upper-right quadrants (as depicted in
Fig. 5) each contribute 2c+i tiles, so ac+1,i = 2ac,i+2
c+i+1. When there are no
bisections, the i-bit value space has a0,i = 2
i+1 − 1 tiles, from which we obtain
ac,i = 2
c
(
2i(c+ 2)− 1
)
. The sum of jR over protocol-induced rectangles R in
the upper-left quadrant is bc,i. For a rectangle R in the lower-right quadrant,
jR equals 2
c+i plus jR′ , where R
′ is the corresponding rectangle in the upper-
left quadrant; there are ac,i such R, so the sum of jR over protocol-induced
rectangles R in the upper-left quadrant is bc,i+ ac,i2
c+i. Finally, the sum of jR
over R in the lower-left quadrant equals
∑2c+i−1
h=0 h and the sum over R in the
top-right quadrant equals
∑2c+i
h=1 h. Thus, bc+1,i = 2bc,i+ac,i2
c+i+22(c+i); with
b0,i =
∑2i−1
h=0 h+
∑2i−1
h=1 h, we obtain bc,i = 2
c+i−1
(
(1 + 2c)
(
−1 + 2i
)
+ 2c+ic
)
.
Rewriting (2), we obtain
PARc,i =
c+ 3
2
−
2c
2c+i+1
+
1
2c+i+1
−
1
2c+1
.
Recalling that k = c+ i, the proof is complete.
For the protocols corresponding to values of g(k) ranging from 0 to k (ranging
from the ascending-price English auction to the Bisection Auction), we may
thus relate the amount of communication saved (relative to the English auction)
to the effect of this on the PAR.
Corollary 5.9 Let g be a function that maps non-negative integers to non-
negative integers. Then the average-case objective PAR with respect to the uni-
form distribution for the Bisection Auctiong(k) is bounded if g is bounded and
is unbounded if g is unbounded. We then have that the Bisection Auctiong(k)
may require the exchange of Θ(k+ 2k−g(k)) bits, and it has an average-case ob-
jective PAR of Θ(1 + g(k)).
Remark 5.10 Some of the sequences that appear in the proof above also ap-
pear in other settings. For example, the sequences {a0,i}i, {a1,i}i, and {a2,i}i
are slightly shifted versions of sequences A000225, A033484, and A028399, re-
spectively, in the OEIS [21], which notes other combinatorial interpretations of
them.
5.4.1 Subjective privacy for bounded-bisection auctions
Theorem 5.11 (The average-case PAR w.r.t. 1 of the bounded-bi-
section auction) The average-case PAR with respect to 1 of the Bisection
Auctiong(k) is
g(k) + 5
4
−
1
2g(k)+2
−
1
2k−g(k)+1
−
g(k)− 2
2k+2
with respect to the uniform distribution.
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Proof: The approach is similar to that in the proof of Thm. 5.8. We start by
specializing (1) to the present case.
Each ideal region in which bidder 1 wins is a rectangle of size 1; each ideal
region in which bidder 2 wins is a rectangle of height 1 and width strictly less
than 2k. For a protocol-induced rectangle R, let jR = 2
k−|RI(R)|. Let c = g(k)
and let i = k−c ≥ 0. Let T 1c,i be the refinement of the 2nd-Price-Auctionk 1-
partition of the k-bit value space induced by the Bisection-Auctiong(k). Let
xc,i be the number of rectangles in T
1
c,i in which bidder 2 (the column player)
wins, and let yc,i be the sum, over all rectangles R in which bidder 2 wins, of
the quantity 2c+i − |RI(R)|. Let zc,i be the number of rectangles R in which
bidder 1 (the row player) wins.
Using PAR1c,i to denote the PAR w.r.t. bidder 1 in this case (c bisections and
i = k − c), we may rewrite (1) as
PAR
1
c,i =
1
22(c+i)



 ∑
RP in which
1 wins
|RI(RP )|

+

 ∑
RP in which
2 wins
|RI(RP )|




=
1
22(c+i)
[
(zc,i) +
(
2c+ixc,i − yc,i
)]
.
We now turn to the computation of xc,i, yc,i, and zc,i.
Following the same approach as in the proof of Thm. 5.8, we have xc+1,i =
2xc,i+2
c+i, yc+1,i = 2yc,i+
∑2c+i
j=1 j+2
c+ixc,i, and zc+1,i = 2zc,i+2
2(c+i). With
x0,i = 2
i − 1, y0,i =
∑2i−1
j=1 j, and z0,i =
∑2c+1
j=1 j, we obtain
xc,i = 2
c−1
(
2ic+ 2i+1 − 2
)
,
yc,i = 2
c+i−2
(
2c+ic+ 2c+i + 2i − 2c+1 + c
)
, and
zc,i = 2
c+i−1(2c+i + 1).
Using these in our expression for PAR1c,i, we obtain
PAR
1
c,i =
c+ 5
4
+
2− c
2c+i+2
−
1
2i+1
−
1
2c+2
.
Recalling that k = c+ i and g(k) = c completes the proof.
Theorem 5.12 (The average-case PAR w.r.t. 2 of the bounded-bi-
section auction) The average-case PAR with respect to 1 of the Bisection
Auctiong(k) is
g(k) + 5
4
−
1
2g(k)+2
+
g(k)
2k+2
with respect to the uniform distribution.
Proof: The approach is essentially the same as in the proof of Thm. 5.11,
although the induced partition differs slightly.
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Let c = g(k) and let i = k − c ≥ 0. Let T 2c,i be the refinement of the 2nd-
Price-Auctionk 2-partition of the k-bit value space induced by theBisection-
Auctiong(k). Let uc,i be the number of rectangles in T
2
c,i in which bidder 1 (the
row player) wins, and let vc,i be the sum, over all rectangles R in which bidder
1 wins, of the quantity 2c+i − |RI(R)|. Let wc,i be the number of rectangles R
in which bidder 2 (the column player) wins. Using PAR2c,i to denote the PAR
w.r.t. bidder 2 in this case (c bisections and i = k − c), we may rewrite (1) as
PAR
2
c,i =
1
22(c+i)
[(
2c+iuc,i − vc,i
)
+ (wc,i)
]
.
Mirroring the approach of the proof of Thm. 5.11, we have uc+1,i = 2uc,i +
2c+i, vc+1,i = 2vc,i + 2
c+i−1(2c+i − 1) + 2c+iuc,i, and wc,i = 2
c+i−1(2c+i − 1).
With u0,i = 2
i and v0,i = 2
i−1(2i − 1), we obtain
uc,i = 2
c+i−1(c+ 2),
vc,i = 2
c+i−2
(
2c+i(c+ 1) + 2i − c− 2
)
, and
wc,i = 2
c+i−1(2c+i − 1).
Using these in our expression for PAR2c,i, we obtain
PAR
2
c,i =
c+ 5
4
−
1
2c+2
+
c
2c+i+2
.
Recalling that k = c+ i and g(k) = c completes the proof.
Because g(k) ≥ 0, the average-case PAR with respect to 2 is at least as large
as the average-case PAR with respect to 1; this gives the average-case subjective
PAR of the Bisection Auctiong(k) as follows.
Corollary 5.13 (Average-case subjective PAR of the bounded-bisection
auction) The average-case subjective PAR of the Bisection Auctiong(k) is
g(k) + 5
4
−
1
2g(k)+2
+
g(k)
2k+2
with respect to the uniform distribution.
Finally, Table 2 summarizes the average-case PAR results (with respect to
the uniform distribution) for 2nd-Price Auctionk.
6 Discussion and Future Directions
6.1 Other Notions of Approximate Privacy
By our definitions, the worst-case/average-case PARs of a protocol are deter-
mined by the worst-case/expected value of the expression |R
I(x)|
|RP (x)| , where R
P (x)
is the monochromatic rectangle induced by P for input x, and RI(x) is the
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Avg.-Case Obj. PAR Avg.-Case Subj. PAR
English Auction 1 1
Bisection Auctiong(k)
g(k)+3
2 −
2g(k)
2k+1
+ g(k)+54 −
1
2g(k)+2
+
1
2k+1
− 1
2g(k)+1
g(k)
2k+2
Bisection Auction
k
2 + 1
k+5
4 +
k−1
2k+2
Sealed-Bid Auction 2
k+1
3 +
1
3·2k
2k
3 + 1−
1
3·2k
Table 2: Average-case PARs (with respect to the uniform distribution) for 2nd-
Price Auctionk
monochromatic region containing A(f)x in the ideal monochromatic partition
of A(f). That is, informally, we are interested in the ratio of the size of the ideal
monochromatic region for a specific pair of inputs to the size of the monochro-
matic rectangle induced by the protocol for that pair. More generally, we can
define worst-case/average-case PARs with respect to a function g by considering
the ratio g(R
I (x),x)
g(RP (x),x)
. Our definitions of PARs set g(R,x) to be the cardinality of
R. This captures the intuitive notion of the indistinguishability of inputs that
is natural to consider in the context of privacy preservation. Other definitions
of PARs may be appropriate in analyzing other notions of privacy. We suggest
a few here; further investigation of these and other definitions provides many
interesting avenues for future work.
Probability mass. Given a probability distribution D over the parties’
inputs, a seemingly natural choice of g is the probability mass. That is, for
any region R, g(R) = PrD(R), the probability (according to D) that the input
corresponds to an entry in R. However, a simple example illustrates that this
intuitive choice of g is problematic: Consider a problem for which {0, . . . , n} ×
{i} is a maximal monochromatic region for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 as illustrated in
the left part of Fig. 6. Let P be the communication protocol consisting of
a single round in which party 1 reveals whether or not his value is 0; this
induces the monochromatic tiling with tiles {(0, i)} and {(1, i), . . . , (n, i)} for
each i as illustrated in the right part of Fig. 6. Now, let D1 and D2 be the
probability distributions over the inputs x = (x1, x2) such that, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n−1
and 1 ≤ j ≤ n, PrD1 [(x1, x2) = (0, i)] =
ǫ
n
, PrD1 [(x1, x2) = (j, i)] =
1−ǫ
n2
,
PrD2 [(x1, x2) = (0, i)] =
1−ǫ
n
, and PrD2 [(x1, x2) = (j, i)] =
ǫ
n2
for some small
ǫ > 0. Intuitively, any reasonable definition of PAR should imply that, for D1,
P provides “bad” privacy guarantees (because w.h.p. it reveals the value of x1),
and, for D2, P provides “good” privacy (because w.h.p. it reveals little about
x1). In sharp contrast, choosing g to be the probability mass results in the same
average-case PAR in both cases.
Other additive functions. In our definition of PAR and in the probability-
mass approach, each input x in a rectangle contributes to g(R,x) in a way
that is independent of the other inputs in R. Below, we discuss some natu-
ral approaches that violate this condition, but we start by noting that other
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0 1 n−1
0
1
n
0 1 n−1
0
1
n
...
...
Figure 6: Maximal monochromatic regions (left) and protocol-induced rectangles
(right) for an example showing the deficiencies of PAR definitions based on probability
mass.
functions that satisfy this condition may be of interest. For example, taking
g(R,x) = 1 +
∑
y∈R\x d(x,y), where d is some distance defined on the input
space, gives our original definition of PAR when d(x, y) = 1 − δx,y and might
capture other interesting definitions (in which indistinguishable inputs that are
farther away from x contribute more to the privacy for x). (The addition of
1 ensures that the ratio g(RI ,x)/g(RP ,x) is defined, but that can be accom-
plished in other ways if needed.) Importantly, here and below, the notion of
distance that is used might not be a Euclidean metric on the n-player input
space [0, 2k − 1]n. It could instead (and likely would) focus on the problem-
specific interpretation of the input space. Of course, there are may possible
variations on this (e.g., also accounting for the probability mass).
Maximum distance. We might take the view that a protocol does not
reveal much about an input x if there is another input that is “very different”
from x that the protocol cannot distinguish from x (even if the total number of
things that are indistinguishable from x under the protocol is relatively small).
For some distance d on the input space, we might than take g to be something
like 1 + maxy∈R\{x} d(y,x).
Plausible deniability. One drawback to the maximum-distance approach
is that it does not account for the probability associated with inputs that are
far from x (according to a distance d) and that are indistinguishable from x
under the protocol. While there might be an input y that is far away from
x and indistinguishable from x, the probability of y might be so small that
the observer feels comfortable assuming that y does not occur. A more re-
alistic approach might be one of “plausible deniability.” This makes use of a
plausibility threshold—intuitively, the minimum probability that the “far away”
inputs(s) (which is/are indistinguishable from x) must be assigned in order to
“distract” the observer from the true input x. This threshold might correspond
to, e.g., “reasonable doubt” or other levels of certainty. We then consider how
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far we can move away from x while still having “enough” mass (i.e., more
than the plausibility threshold) associated with the elements indistinguishable
from x that are still farther away. We could then take g to be something like
1 + max{d0|PrD({y ∈ R|d(y,x) ≥ d0})/PrD(R) ≥ t}; other variations might
focus on mass that is concentrated in a particular direction from x. (In quantify-
ing privacy, we would expect to only consider those R with positive probability,
in which case dividing by PrD(R) would not be problematic.) Here we use
PrD(R) to normalize the weight that is far away from x before comparing it
to the threshold t; intuitively, an observer would know that the value is in the
same region as x, and so this seems to make the most sense.
Relative rectangle size. One observation is that a bidder likely has a
very different view of an auctioneer’s being able to tell (when some particular
protocol is used) whether his bid lies between 995 and 1005 than he does of
the auctioneer’s being able to tell whether his bid lies between 5 and 15. In
each case, however, the bids in the relevant range are indistinguishable under
the protocol from 11 possible bids. In particular, the privacy gained from an
input’s being distinguishable from a fixed number of other inputs may (or may
not) depend on the context of the problem and the intended interpretation of the
values in the input space. This might lead to a choice of g such as diamd(R)/|x|,
where diamd is the diameter of R with respect to some distance d and |x| is
some (problem-specific) measure of the size of x (e.g., bid value in an auction).
Numerous variations on this are natural and may be worth investigating.
Information-theoretic approaches. Information-theoretic approaches
using conditional entropy are also natural to consider when studying privacy,
and these have been used in various settings. Most relevantly, Bar-Yehuda et
al. [2] defined multiple measures based on the conditional mutual information
about one player’s value (viewed as a random variable) revealed by the protocol
trace and knowledge of the other player’s value. It would also be natural to study
objective-PAR versions using the entropy of the random variable corresponding
to the (multi-player) input conditioned only on the protocol output (and not
the input of any player). Such approaches might facilitate the comparison of
privacy between different problems.
6.2 Open Questions
There are many interesting directions for future research:
• As discussed in the previous subsection, the definition and exploration of
other notions of PARs is a challenging and intriguing direction for future
work.
• We have shown that, for both The Millionaires Problemk and 2nd-
Price Auctionk, reasonable average-case PARs with respect to the uni-
form distribution are achievable. We conjecture that our upper bounds
for these problems extend to all possible distributions over inputs.
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• An interesting open question is proving lower bounds on the average-case
PARs for The Millionaires Problemk and 2nd-Price Auctionk.
• It would be interesting to apply the PAR framework presented in this
paper to other functions.
• The extension of our PAR framework to the n-party communication model
is a challenging direction for future research.
• Starting from the same place that we did, namely [8, 17], Bar-Yehuda et
al. [2] provided three definitions of approximate privacy. The one that
seems most relevant to the study of privacy-approximation ratios is their
notion of h-privacy. It would be interesting to know exactly when and
how it is possible to express PARs in terms of h-privacy and vice versa.
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A Relation to the Work of Bar-Yehuda et al. [2]
While there are certainly some parallels between the work here and the Bar-
Yehuda et al. work [2], there are significant differences in what the two frame-
works capture. Specifically:
1. The results in [2] deal with what can be learned by a party who knows
one of the inputs. By contrast, our notion of objective PAR captures the
effect of a protocol on privacy with respect to an external observer who
does not know any of the players private values.
2. More importantly, the framework of [2] does not address the size of monochro-
matic regions. As illustrated by the following example, the ability to do
so is necessary to capture the effects of protocols on interesting aspects of
privacy that are captured by our definitions of PAR.
Consider the function f : {0, . . . , 2n−1}×{0, . . . , 2n−1} → {0, . . . , 2n−2}
defined by f(x, y) = floor(x2 ) if x < 2
n−1 and f(x, y) = 2n−2 otherwise.
Consider the following two protocols for f : in P , player 1 announces
his value x if x < 2n−1 and otherwise sends 2n−1 (which indicates that
f(x, y) = 2n−2); in Q, player 1 announces floor(x2 ) if x < 2
n − 1 and x if
x = 2n − 1. Observe that each protocol induces 2n−1 + 1 rectangles.
Intuitively, the effect on privacy of these two protocols is different. For half
of the inputs, P reduces by a factor of 2 the number of inputs from which
they are indistinguishable while not affecting the indistinguishability of
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the other inputs. Q does not affect the indistinguishability of the inputs
affected by P , but it does reduce the number of inputs indistinguishable
from a given input with x ≥ 2n−1 by at least a factor of 2n−2.
Our notion of PAR is able to capture the different effects on privacy of the
protocols P and Q. (The average-case objective PARs are constant and
exponential in n, respectively.) By contrast, the three quantifications of
privacy from [2]—Ic, Ii, and Ic−i—do not distinguish between these two
protocols; we now sketch the arguments for this claim.
For each protocol, any function h for which the protocol is weakly h-
private must take at least 2n−1 + 1 different values. This bound is tight
for both P and Q. Thus, Ic cannot distinguish between the effects of P
and Q on f .
The number of rectangles induced by P that intersect each row and column
equals the number induced byQ. Considering the geometric interpretation
of IP and IQ, as well as the discussion in Sec. VII.A of [2], we see that Ii
and Ic−i (applied to protocols) cannot distinguish between the effects of
P and Q on f .
B Truthful Public-Good Problem
B.1 Problem
As in Sec. 4.3, the government is considering the construction of a bridge at
cost c. Each taxpayer has a private value that is the utility he would gain from
the bridge if it were built, and the government wants to build the bridge if and
only if the sum of the taxpayers’ private values is at least c. Now, in addition to
determining whether to build the bridge, the government incentivizes truthful
disclosure of the private values by requiring taxpayer i to pay c −
∑
j 6=i xj if∑
j 6=i xj < c but
∑
i xi ≥ c (see, e.g., [20] for a discussion of this type of
approach). The government should thus learn whether or not to build the bridge
and how much, if anything, each taxpayer should pay. The formal description
of the function is as follows; the corresponding ideal partition of the value space
is shown in Fig. 7, in which regions for which the output is “Build” are just
labeled with the appropriate value of (t1, t2).
Definition 21 (Truthful Public Goodk,c)
Input: c, x1, x2 ∈ {0, . . . , 2
k − 1} (each represented by a k-bit string)
Output: “Do Not Build” if x1+x2 < c; “Build” and (t1, t2) if x1+x2 ≥ c, where
ti = c− x3−i if x3−i < c and x1 + x2 ≥ c, and ti = 0 otherwise.
B.2 Results
Proposition B.1 (Average-case objective PAR of Truthful Public
Goodk,c) The average-case objective PAR of Truthful Public Goodk,c
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Do Not Build
(3,1) (2,1)
(2,2)
(1,1)
(1,2)
(1,3)
(0,4)
(0,3)
(0,2)
(0,1)
(1,0)(2,0)(3,0)(4,0) (0,0)
Figure 7: Ideal partition of the value space for Truthful Public Goodk,c
with k = 3 and c = 4.
with respect to the uniform distribution is
1 +
c3
22k+1
(1−
1
c2
).
Proof: We may rewrite Eq. 1 as (adding subscripts for the values of k and c
in this problem):
PARk,c =
1
22k
[∑
RDNB
|RI(RDNB)|+
∑
RB
|RI(RB)|
]
,
where the first sum is taken over rectangles RDNB for which the output is “Do
Not Build” and the second sum is taken over rectangles RB for which the out-
put is “Build” together with some (t1, t2). Using the same argument as for The
Millionaires Problemk, the first sum must be taken over at least c rectan-
gles; the ideal region containing these rectangles has size
∑c
i=1 i = c(c + 1)/2.
Considering the second sum, each of the ideal regions containing a protocol-
induced rectangle is in fact a rectangle. If the protocol did not further partition
these rectangles (and it is easy to see that such protocols exist) then the total
contribution of the second sum is just the total number of inputs for which the
output is “Do Not Build” together with some pair (t1, t2), i.e., this contribution
is 4k − c(c+ 1)/2. We may thus rewrite PARk,c as
PARk,c =
1
22k
[
c
c(c+ 1)
2
+ 4k −
c(c+ 1)
2
]
= 1 +
c3
22k+1
(1 −
1
c2
)
Unsurprisingly, if we take c = 2k − 1 (as in Public Goodk in Sec. 4.3), we
obtain PARk,2k−1 = 2
k−1 − 12 +
1
2k
, which is essentially half of the average-case
PAR for The Millionaires Problemk.
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